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American Diplomacy. By Carl Russell Fish. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1915. Pp. 541 + maps.

Little that is new is contained in this volume, and nothing to which even a surly reader can object. It is precisely what its author intended it to be, "a comprehensive and balanced, though brief, review of the history of American diplomacy." When it is stated that the work of Professor Fish treats but few topics that are new, nothing more is meant than that those interested in American history have already in a monograph, an essay, or a book learned something of the subjects considered. But we would not be understood to assert that these diplomatic questions can be overtaken in a summer day or in a season. In the general histories of the United States one may read many a year and not form so clear an outline of our diplomatic relations as is sketched in the present work. In a word, this essay includes in one convenient volume a brief examination of every important diplomatic question from the era of the Revolution to the early stages of the great war in Europe. Fortunate is the reader who has added to his library this splendid summary of the foreign relations of the United States. But the service of the author is greater than the physical labor, and that was considerable, of assembling fragmentary information dispersed over the broad field of American historical literature; that might be achieved by industry. All his material, often Gothic in form, has been digested by the author and so arranged as clearly to show the continuity of our entire foreign policy. The re-study of themes more or less familiar may be read without effort because its form is attractive. In a double sense the author is a heretic; for his purpose he has adopted a style that is faultless. If he had chosen to write slovenly, he could not fairly be censured, for he could justify himself by the example of battalions of his contemporaries. One perceives, too, traces of heresy in his failure to introduce our overworked friend, General Bibliography. But really his presence is not needed to testify to scholarship, for one sees the author's wide reading, sometimes almost concealed in a phrase, sometimes condensed into an epithet. Our readers are not to infer that this book furnishes few or no authorities. On the contrary, these are constantly cited, as footnotes, and always precisely where they belong. Instead of being impartially, that is, alphabetically marshalled at the beginning or at the end of the volume, they are made to appear in their proper places. All questions are discussed concisely and temperately. In short, in our opinion Professor Fish has written a remarkable book.

In his summary of the Treaty of Ghent the author does not notice the value of the double victory at Plattsburg, September 11, 1814. That

was of much importance to the territorial integrity of the United States, for about the time that the joint land and naval expedition moved down toward the Saranac, the British were likewise endeavoring to establish themselves in the lower valley of the Penobscot. That was not for the purpose of enjoying the beauty of the scenery, though that is almost unequalled, but for the more practical object of conquering New England. The invaders spared Vermont, where they believed they had friends and where they knew there were cattle. Instead of moving down the eastern shore of Lake Champlain they leisurely advanced to Plattsburg on the opposite side. Their hopes of conquest were shattered when MacDonough destroyed or dispersed their fleet and Macomb defeated their army. That was the most important success of which the American commissioners brought tidings to Ghent.

It is stated, page 250, that "the administration [of Jackson] was able to show a clear record." The public record, indeed, was all that could be desired, but, if a contradiction in terms is permissible, it is possible that there may have been unwritten annals, and it is certain that there were private chronicles. Without pausing to discuss or to appraise Jackson's legendary farewell to Houston or that leader's forecast of his own high destiny it is a fact that Jackson's last official act was the nomination of a *chargé* or Minister to Texas. Thereafter the hero passed to the Hermitage with influence unimpaired. Writing, September 18, 1843 to his friend William B. Lewis, Jackson says, among other things, "We must regain Texas, *peacefully if we can, forcibly if we must.*" Precisely what did he mean by regaining Texas? He was simply expressing his belief in a slanderous assertion that during the negotiations with Spain, preceding the Treaty of 1819, more generous terms were offered by Luis de Onís than those which were finally accepted by John Quincy Adams and President Monroe. As those "better terms" were rejected, Jackson claimed that the Treaty which was ratified by the Senate was "void and of no force." This strange contention as to the obligation of treaties is hardly equalled in American constitutional law except by Jackson's other theory that each of the great departments of Government is free to construe the Constitution for itself. No American statesman was ever more eager to accomplish anything than was Jackson to annex Texas. "Peacefully if we can, forcibly if we must" was the burden of his letters to Major Lewis. One would almost think that he had heard of Cato.

On page 259 and elsewhere are references to the private claims of American citizens against the Government of Mexico. So smoothly is this entire subject passed over that to a reader the treatment of Mexico appears to have been half decent. As a matter of fact, it is doubtful

whether any government has ever presented against another an equal number of claims so baseless and so ridiculous. As is well known, the umpire, Baron de Roenne, the Prussian Minister, rejected nearly three-fourths of the whole. This incident is not essential to the survey of Professor Fish, but its omission gives to the transaction a complexion fairer than its own.

It was falsely charged that the Presidential election of 1824 was determined in favor of Adams by a bargain between *Bliffl* and *Black George*, a combination of the Puritan and the blackleg. This accusation only proved that John Randolph had read *Tom Jones*. Whatever may be said of Clay, John Quincy Adams was one of that honored list of American statesmen who would not have been a party to any transaction in the least degree doubtful. With the dismemberment of Mexico he had nothing to do. That shadow was flung athwart the State of Tennessee and not across the face of Massachusetts. It may be observed that these omissions do little to mar the valuable work of Professor Fish. In our judgment, however, their inclusion would have counted for completeness.

The Japanese Problem in the United States; An Investigation for the Commission On Relations With Japan Appointed by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. By H. A. Millis, Professor of Economics, University of Kansas. The Macmillan Company, 1915. Pp. 334.

The present book incorporates much of the information gathered by the same author for the reports of the Immigration Commission published five years earlier. Recently Professor Millis spent several weeks on the Pacific Coast bringing his knowledge of the problem of Japanese immigration down to date.

The Japanese immigration problem which at first presented itself as a labor problem has in recent years appeared as a land problem. Relatively to immigration from European lands Japanese immigration has never been extensive. In 1870, the census reported 55 Japanese as residents of the United States. In 1910 there were only 72,157 Japanese residents of the continental United States. Before the agreement of 1907 which grew out of the California school trouble Japanese were coming to the United States at the rate of six or seven thousand a year. Since that agreement was made Japanese immigration has been almost a negligible quantity. The agreement provides "that the Japanese government shall issue passports to the continental United States only